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ABSTRACT
Peter Singer’s arguments against the morality of the typical Ameri-
can diet focus on the pain of animals, and lead to the conclusion 
that we must become committed vegans.  His approach ignores the 
impact that different psychological capacities can legitimately have 
on our moral appraisal of the interests of beings.  Although we ought 
to eat less meat because of the externalized environmental costs that 
factory farming inflicts upon future people, an ideal diet may contain 
some environmentally sustainably raised meat.  Finally, the percep-
tion of ethical puritanism in committed vegans may be an obstacle to 
achieving the real reductions in animal suffering that they advocate.
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Singer and Speciesism
Just one of the reasons we all ought to thank Peter Singer 
is for his arguments popularizing the concept of “speciesism” 
(Singer 1975, 22).  For the great majority of the history of eth-
ics, ethics has been anthropocentric.  Except for Bentham and 
Mill, all of the major ethical theories in the West have been 
centered on asking questions about the relations of humans to 
one another.  Since humans were taken to be the only beings 
capable of moral agency, they were posited as the only beings 
deserving of moral consideration.  
But Peter Singer attacks that presupposition.  He argues that 
granting moral considerability to all and only human beings is 
speciesist and that it is wrong for the same reasons that racism 
or sexism are wrong.  The speciesist faces the same problem in 
environmental ethics as the racist and sexist face in social eth-
ics; the problem of arbitrary distinction.  Each of these views 
draws a boundary around a particular group of beings and 
claims that the interests of those inside the boundary count for 
more than the interests of those outside, but each fails to pro-
vide a principled reason for granting greater moral weight to 
the interests of their preferred group.  If one asks the speciesist 
why all and only human beings deserve moral consideration, 
he cannot say that it is because they are all moral agents; they 
aren’t.  A newborn human infant is not yet a moral agent.  And 
aged humans suffering from severe dementia, or humans who 
have experienced higher-brain death but who are still, techni-
cally, alive are no longer moral agents.  Such non-paradigmatic 
humans (NPH’s) can also include humans who never were and 
never will be moral agents, for example, infants born with 
anencephaly who will die shortly after birth.  So what is the 
speciesist to say in attempting to justify his claim that all and 
only human beings deserve moral consideration?  He cannot 
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point to intelligence or rationality as the criterion that morally 
separates humans from nonhuman animals.  Many human be-
ings are less intelligent than a normal adult chimpanzee.  When 
it comes to such objections, all the speciesist has left to say is 
that we deserve moral consideration just because we are human 
beings.  But here the arbitrary nature of the speciesist position 
shows itself quite clearly.  Racist and sexist views are wrong 
because they attempt to justify the oppression of one group by 
appealing to features that are irrelevant from a moral point of 
view.  Singer points out that speciesists are guilty of the same 
error.  He therefore wants to extend moral considerability to all 
sentient creatures (all creatures capable of feeling pain).  And I 
agree with this claim (and would even extend it somewhat): all 
beings with interests deserve to have their interests counted in 
our moral deliberations.
But Singer believes that the recognition of the concept of 
speciesism ought to lead us to accept the “Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests” (PECI):
The interests of every being that has interests are to 
be taken into account and treated equally with the like 
interests of any other being…if a being suffers, there 
can be no moral justification for refusing to take that 
suffering into consideration, and indeed, to count it 
equally with the like suffering (if rough comparisons 
can be made) of any other being (Singer 1975; 5, 8).
Here I believe Singer goes too far.  He argues that because 
pain is pain whether it is human-pain or chicken-pain and pain 
is always bad, we ought to consider the pain of chickens equal-
ly with the pain of persons in making our moral decisions.  But 
the PECI does not follow from the rejection of speciesism.  Al-
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though the speciesist is irrational to assign differing degrees of 
moral weight to the interests of beings based on species mem-
bership, which is morally irrelevant, it seems just as irratio-
nal to assign equal moral status to the interests of all sentient 
beings, ignoring morally relevant differences in psychological 
capacities between them.  Singer allows that the PECI does not 
imply that it is just as wrong to kill a normal adult chicken as 
it is to kill a normal adult human being.  He says that the inter-
ests that beings have in continuing to live will vary according 
to the psychological capacities they have (Singer 1975, 19).  So 
he recognizes a difference in the value of the lives of beings 
with different psychological capacities, but he refuses to grant 
any distinction between the moral importance of the non-vital 
interests of beings with differing psychological capacities.  
Anthropocentrism vs. Logocentrism: Kant was 
no Speciesist, but…
Speciesists assign moral weight to the fact that a particular 
being is human.  But there are good philosophical reasons for 
us to distinguish between being human and being a person. 
Logocentrists assign moral weight not to species membership, 
but to the possession of psychological capacities, particularly 
those marking off the class of “persons”.  In the interests of 
brevity, I must skip over an enormous amount of philosophical 
work on the boundaries of the concept of personhood.  Suffice 
it to say that although I disagree with Michael Tooley’s claim 
that infanticide is morally permissible, my own views roughly 
follow his “self-consciousness requirement” (Tooley 1972, 62). 
Hence, I will focus on two criteria that seem to offer us some 
promise of drawing a coherent (if somewhat fuzzy) boundary 
around the concept: potential rationality and self-conscious-
ness.
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In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Imman-
uel Kant tells us that every rational being exists as an end in 
herself, and that in contrast to things, which have a price and 
are to be used, rational beings (which he refers to as ‘persons’) 
have dignity and ought to be treated with respect.  Hence, we 
get the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “So 
act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of any other, in every case at the same time as an end, never 
as a means only” (Kant 1785, 88).  Now personally, I wish that 
Kant had not used the word ‘humanity’ here, but in any case, 
I think it is very clear from what Kant says elsewhere that he 
meant to refer to the moral status established by a psychologi-
cal capacity to guide one’s life according to the Moral Law (to 
be a lawgiver unto oneself), rather than to biological member-
ship in a species.  That is, he meant to focus on personhood, 
not on the particular natural bodies of human organisms.  In 
The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, Kant says, “The power 
of proposing to ourselves an end is the characteristic of human-
ity (as distinguished from the brutes)” (Kant 1780, 27).  This 
capacity to set an end for oneself beyond the promptings of in-
stinct or inclination is the characteristic that sets persons apart 
for Kant, not membership in a biological species.
Finally, in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant says:
…unless we deny that the notion of morality has any 
truth or reference to any possible object, we must ad-
mit that its law must be valid, not merely for human 
beings but for all rational beings as such…we must 
not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of 
this principle from the particular attributes of human 
nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional ne-
Stephen Scales
84
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
cessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational 
beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and 
for this reason only be also a law for all human wills 
(Kant 1785; 68, 84).
Hence, for Kantians at least, there is a distinction to be 
drawn between humans and persons; Kant was no speciesist.  
But even though Kant did not assign moral weight to species 
membership alone, he did ignore the psychological capacity for 
sentience in assigning moral status to beings and to their inter-
ests.  According to Kant, beings that are not persons are merely 
things, entirely lacking in moral status in their own right.  Oth-
er than his directives against animal cruelty (which are meant 
to protect our own character, not any animal’s interests), (Kant 
1780b, 240) Kant allows that every being that is not a person 
may be used as a means only (Kant 1785, 87).
On one side of the moral divide, Kant grants the highest 
moral status (indeed, infinite worth) to rational beings capa-
ble of guiding their lives according to the moral law.  And on 
the other side, zero moral status attaches to everything else 
indiscriminately.  Although I am in disagreement with much of 
what Peter Singer says, here he has something to teach Kant: 
sentience matters in terms of moral status.  To conceive of dol-
phins, puppies, oysters, trees, and stones as equal in moral sta-
tus is to ignore what are obviously important and morally rel-
evant differences between these beings.  Yes, full broad ratio-
nality (or the capacity for moral agency) counts morally, but so 
do potential rationality, and self-consciousness, and sentience, 
and, I would suggest, so does simply being a living being (or 
having interests in the broadest sense).  And even if we are 
justified in assigning greater moral status to persons, it does 
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not necessarily follow that we have to assign zero moral status 
to all nonpersons.  Just as Singer is wrong to ignore the moral 
relevance of psychological capacities above sentience, so Kant 
is wrong to ignore the moral relevance of psychological capaci-
ties below full broad rationality (his criterion for personhood).
Persons vs. Nonpersons: Fuzzy Boundaries, 
Levels of Value, and Ambivalence
My own thinking about the concept of personhood leads me 
to two conclusions.  The first is that we are not able to provide 
a precise set of necessary and sufficient conditions for person-
hood that is both precise enough to yield a determinate answer 
about whether something is a person in every case, and in com-
plete agreement with our fundamental moral intuitions (Eng-
lish 1975, 235).  If we define rationality as the capacity to solve 
complex conceptual problems and to guide one’s life according 
to principle, and define self-consciousness as an awareness of 
oneself as a continuing subject of experiences, the question of 
just how much actual or potential capacity or awareness is re-
quired in order to be a person seems not to be answerable in a 
way that is both precise and principled.  The concept of a per-
son is a family-resemblance concept, and our intuitions about 
whether something is a person flow from a rough comparison 
between paradigmatic examples of persons (e.g., adult compe-
tent human beings) and beings that lie nearer to the periphery, 
or in the penumbra, of the concept.  There may be some beings 
that we can clearly say are persons (everyone reading this, for 
example), some beings that we can clearly say are not persons 
(a normal adult chicken), and some beings about which we are 
not exactly sure what to say (normal adult chimpanzees, hu-
mans who have experienced significant higher brain injuries, 
and other “near persons” (Varner 2012, 134)).  
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The question of how much actual or potential rationality or 
self-consciousness is required for personhood leads directly 
into my second conclusion: that personhood stands at one pole 
of a continuum of levels of both psychological capacity and 
moral status.  It’s not as if there is a bright line separating per-
sons from non-persons and absolute moral status should be ac-
corded to beings on one side and zero moral status should be 
accorded to beings on the other.  Rather, just as the psychologi-
cal capacities that paradigmatically signal personhood can be 
found in greater and lesser degrees, so our ascription of moral 
value ought to admit of degrees as well.  That is, even if there is 
a threshold above which we should say that every being ought 
to be treated as an end in herself, it does not follow that we 
ought to simply ignore the interests of beings lying below such 
a threshold.  The continuum of levels of psychological capaci-
ties displayed by creatures in the natural world should track 
alongside a continuum of levels of moral status that we ought to 
attribute to them until they reach the threshold of personhood, 
after which they ought to be accorded (the highest) equal moral 
status.  
Nearly every moral theorist admits that psychological ca-
pacities matter morally.  For Singer, sentience confers greater 
moral weight to the interests of mice over the interests of oys-
ters or trees.  For Kant, full broad rationality (or the capacity 
for moral agency) confers greater moral weight to the interests 
of persons over the interests of things.  And other ethicists have 
argued that we can assign greater moral weight to the interests 
of potentially rational beings over the interests of being that are 
not potentially rational (Stone 1987, 815), or to the interests of 
self-conscious beings over the interests of non-self-conscious 
beings (Tooley 1972, 62).  I want to assert (following Degrazia 
2008, 192) that there is a continuum of degrees of moral status 
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corresponding to the continuum of levels of psychological ca-
pacities that we observe in the natural world.  And if one being 
has greater moral status than a second being, a harm to the first 
being matters more morally than a comparable harm to the sec-
ond being.  Hence, we are justified in according unequal levels 
of consideration to both the vital and the non-vital interests of 
beings with significantly different psychological capacities (up 
to the threshold of personhood, above which everyone is mor-
ally equal).  On this view, Chicken-pain is not morally equal to 
the pain of persons reading this: Singer is ignoring morally rel-
evant factors in weighing the moral importance of the non-vital 
interests of different types of sentient beings.  Whether my as-
sertion of this “sliding scale” view of the moral status (and, 
hence, the moral weight of the interests) of various nonpersons 
should be accepted will depend on whether it can successfully 
allow us to explain, predict, and reliably guide our considered 
moral judgments about a multitude of cases. Although I find 
that it tracks my own intuitions and can explain, for example, 
why people are so upset about the shooting of a gorilla in the 
Cincinnati Zoo, yet not very upset at all about eating a chicken 
quesadilla for lunch, I leave it to the reader to decide whether it 
accords with his/her own considered judgments.
Even if we are permitted to give greater moral weight to the 
interests of persons, the sacrifice of the interests of nonpersons 
ought not to be accomplished without what I want to call ‘am-
bivalence’.  What I mean by this is that since some nonpersons 
approach closer than others to the highest level on a scale of 
psychological capacities, we ought to consider them as closer 
to us in terms of moral status as well.  Because we ought to do 
so, our sacrifice of their interests should not be accomplished 
lightly or cavalierly.  It ought to be attended with an appre-
ciation of the value being destroyed, not with regret but with 
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a kind of recognition that one is being morally ‘pulled both 
ways’, hence, ambivalence.  Hence, this logocentric view does 
allow nonspeciesists to give some greater weight to the inter-
ests of persons over those of nonpersons, provided we don’t 
simply ignore the value that is being sacrificed.  How, then, can 
we sort out the relative weights that ought to attach to the inter-
ests of the beings that lie along the moral continuum?  
First, we need to distinguish between various levels of in-
terests that beings have. (VanDeVeer 1998, 116)  Vital inter-
ests will be those necessary for the survival of the being.  For 
example, my interest in breathing is a vital interest.  Serious 
interests will be not absolutely vital, but not merely trivial.  For 
example, my interest in continuing my career, or in maintain-
ing my love-relationships, or my lifestyle are serious interests. 
Trivial interests will be those that are merely a matter of my 
preferred tastes.  For example, my interest in eating mint choc-
olate chip ice cream rather than vanilla will be a trivial interest. 
Now, regarding conflicts between various interests, we might 
lay out the following weighting principles: strong logocentrism 
will say that the interests of persons always trump the interests 
of nonpersons; moderate logocentrism will say that the vital in-
terests of nonpersons cannot be trumped by the trivial interests 
of persons, but only by their serious interests; weak logocen-
trism will say that the vital interests of nonpersons can only be 
trumped by the vital interests of persons, and differential logo-
centrism will adopt the view that whether the trivial interests 
of persons trump the vital interests of nonpersons depends on 
the degree of difference between the psychological capacities 
of the beings involved.  All of these weighting principles would 
allow for eating meat in some cases.  Strong logocentrism al-
lows for eating meat even if it only fulfills a person’s trivial 
interest.  Moderate logocentrism allows for eating meat only if 
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it fulfills a person’s serious interest.  Weak logocentrism allows 
for eating meat only if it is required for a person’s survival. 
And differential logocentrism may allow for eating mollusks, 
shrimp, fish, and (perhaps) birds to fulfill trivial interests of 
persons, but only allow for eating mammals to fulfill serious 
interests of persons.  Assuming that we are prepared to give 
some greater moral weight to the interests of persons over non-
persons, which of these views should we adopt?  
Some argue that strong logocentrism would allow for rec-
reational puppy cooking (cooking live puppies in a microwave 
just for the fun of seeing them squirm), and that it is therefore 
unacceptable as a moral theory (VanDeVeer 1998, 112).  I think 
that there are other reasons why we would judge recreational 
puppy-cooking to be wrong: it causes gratuitous and unnec-
essary suffering.  And it displays something wrong with the 
person who enjoys it (a character defect).  We could judge it 
to be wrong even if we would think it acceptable to humanely 
kill and eat puppies for the (trivial) reason that they taste good. 
Hence, although I would agree that any view that permitted 
recreational puppy-cooking would thereby disqualify itself as 
a viable moral theory, I’m not sure that the strong logocentrist 
would have to permit it.  Although any of these logocentric 
positions may be acceptable, I believe that the differential ver-
sion aligns best with our most fundamental considered moral 
intuitions and judgments.  Weak logocentrism seems to give 
too much weight to the lives of many nonpersons, requiring, for 
example, that we resist the urge to swat a mosquito even while 
it is biting us, and that we forego a scientific experiment that 
would kill one mouse even if it could save millions of people 
from blindness.  Differential logocentrism, on the other hand, 
allows that we may sacrifice the basic interests of a normal 
rabbit for the sake of scientific experiments that promise to 
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uncover a cure for Alzheimer’s disease, yet prohibits recre-
ational puppy cooking.  It recognizes the moral relevance and 
importance of both sentience and personhood.  And it tracks 
the continua (of psychological capacities and moral status) that 
I discussed earlier.
Singer and others also suggest that, in order to avoid specie-
sism, we must always be willing to treat Non-Paradigmatic Hu-
mans (NPH’s) in the same ways that we treat nonhuman non-
persons (Singer 1975, 14-15; Nobis 2008, 8).  Nobis claims that:
Animals seem to be due the respect due to, at least, 
comparably-minded humans. Since this respect re-
quires not raising and killing these humans for the 
mere pleasures of eating them, rational consistency re-
quires the same treatment for chickens, cows, pigs and 
other animals who often have far richer mental lives 
than many humans (Nobis 2008, 8).
I think Singer and Nobis go too far in these claims.  There 
may be other legitimate reasons (besides differences in psycho-
logical capacities) why we don’t treat all nonpersons equally. 
For example, if a person loves a nonperson, or the nonperson 
stands in a “social relationship” (Kittay 2005, 111) with persons 
(e.g., being a member of a family), we have reason not to use 
the nonperson for scientific experimentation.  We may even be 
justified in treating such nonpersons as if they were persons, 
granting them a sort of “honorary personhood” (Cushing 2003, 
564), both morally and even legally.  This is true whether the 
nonperson is human or not.  There may be other moral reasons 
(besides differences in the psychological capacities/moral sta-
tus of two beings) why we might be justified in treating them 
differently.  For example, treating NPH’s in some ways that we 
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find it acceptable to treat cognitively similar nonhumans might 
(simply because of their similarity in physical appearance to 
human persons) inure us to the possibility of treating persons 
in those ways (thus harming our character).  
If we do accept differential logocentrism, we next have to 
ask: “What kind of interest is my interest in eating meat?” 
Singer claims that it is absolutely trivial.  He might ask, “What 
difference does it really make to you whether you have a steak 
or a salad for lunch today?”  And when the question is put this 
way, it does seem to be asking about a trivial preference.  But 
others see their interest in eating meat as more serious.  They 
say that eating meat is one of the things that make life valuable 
for them.  And they would insist that the question should not be 
put in terms of my decision to have a steak or salad for lunch 
today; rather we should ask, “What difference does it really 
make to you if you become a strict vegan for the rest of your 
life?”  Here it becomes clear that there is a substantial change 
in my lifestyle at stake (not just my lunch preference today).  I 
could survive without meat, just as I could survive without lei-
sure time, or with only the minimum calories required to avoid 
starvation.  And it isn’t a big deal for me to do any of these 
things for one day.  If my boss tells me that I have to work on 
the weekend and I’m forced to sacrifice my leisure time for a 
couple of days, it isn’t a big deal.  But if my boss tells me that 
keeping my job will require that I work all of my waking hours 
for the rest of my life, this would require the sacrifice of seri-
ous interests on my part.  The question of whether my interest 
in eating meat is a trivial or serious interest appears to have an 
analogous structure: it seems like a small thing for a day, but 
gets much more serious if we are required to sacrifice it over a 
lifetime.  Hence, if we adopt either weak or differential logo-
centrism, it seems that we have established some philosophi-
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cally defensible space for the ethical permissibility of eating 
meat.  
This does not, of course, mean that we have justified factory 
farming.  Indeed, even the staunchest philosophical proponent 
of eating meat would never try to justify the treatment of many 
animals on factory farms and in slaughterhouses. Such treat-
ment could never be described as displaying ambivalence, or 
as respecting the (lesser, but nonzero) inherent values that are 
being destroyed.  Hence, there are humanitarian reasons for 
ending factory farming, even if we don’t have to stop eating 
meat altogether.  But let us look at another kind of argument 
against the typical American diet: one based on intergenera-
tional environmental justice.
Intergenerational Logocentrism and the Need 
for a Political Movement to Eat Less Meat
It is virtually certain that there will be people who inhab-
it this planet after every currently living person is dead, and 
that they will have roughly similar biological needs as we do. 
And assuming that such beings will exist, I think it is clear 
that we have current moral obligations toward them.  Tempo-
ral distance does not lessen our responsibilities to persons any 
more than spatial distance does.  From a Rawlsian perspective, 
intergenerational justice requires that we adopt environmental 
policies based upon what we would choose from within an in-
tergenerational Rawlsian Original Position, e.g., that each gen-
eration use up no more of the earth’s renewable resources than 
can be replaced, and use up no more of the earth’s nonrenew-
able resources than it can find technological substitutes for.  If 
future people are to have a right to life, they must, by implica-
tion, have a right to a livable environment; I believe that eating 
Stephen Scales
93
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
a small amount of environmentally sustainably produced meat 
does not violate this duty.  
But the American diet is not environmentally sustainable. 
First of all, it requires factory farming.  The average American 
consumes about 200 pounds of meat and fish per year, about 
60 pounds above average annual consumption in the 1950s. 
That requires the production and slaughter of about 100 mil-
lion pigs, 100 million cows, and 9 billion chickens, annually. 
Between 90 and 95% of these animals are raised on factory 
farms.  A typical non-factory farm allocates about 700 times as 
much space per animal as a factory farm (without antibiotics or 
hormones).  Hence, we could not satisfy current U.S. demand 
for meat without factory farming (Singer and Mason 2006, 21). 
And factory farming is hugely environmentally destructive. 
Indeed, as World Watch Magazine puts it,
As environmental science has advanced, it has become 
apparent that the human appetite for animal flesh is 
a driving force behind virtually every major category 
of environmental damage now threatening the human 
future – deforestation, erosion, fresh water scarcity, air 
and water pollution, climate change, biodiversity loss, 
social injustice, the destabilization of communities and 
the spread of disease (Singer and Mason 2006, 240).
Jeremy Rifkin has documented some of the deforestation 
that results from out appetite for meat, and that this defores-
tation is a leading cause of loss of biodiversity (Rifkin 1995, 
445).  Given present levels of deforestation in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa, we can expect the loss of biodiversity to con-
tinue at a similar level (about 1000 times higher than the pre-
human background rate) (De Vos et al. 2015, 9).  The meat-rich 
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American diet is even a greater cause of global warming than 
our beloved automobiles (Walsh 2008).
Hence, we must eat less meat.  The typical American diet is 
destroying the world our descendants will inherit; we are vio-
lating our duties to future people by eating so much meat that 
we are destroying the planet.  It would seem ethically incum-
bent upon us to try to generate a political movement to reduce 
the amount of meat in the American diet.  
Ethical Puritanism and Political Consensus
In The Ethics of What we Eat, Peter Singer and Jim Mason 
argue that we all ought to move toward a vegan lifestyle, elimi-
nating animal products from our diets completely.  Although 
I am sympathetic to the idea that we should all consume less 
animal products, I’m not convinced that the radical elimination 
of animal products should be promoted as an ethical require-
ment.  Although simple intergenerational justice requires that 
we take steps to prevent the destruction of the planet, complete 
abstention from the use of animal products is not (as some have 
claimed) “the single most effective thing you can do to reduce 
your carbon footprint.” (PETA 2012) Abstention from repro-
ductive sex would be a far more effective measure, as it would 
eliminate the consumption of all of my children and their de-
scendants.  And suicide would be the best thing we could do for 
future people (eliminating not just the consumption of all of the 
future people who could be produced by me and my descen-
dants, but eliminating my own consumption entirely as well). 
I think we all sincerely hope that our duties to the future don’t 
require that we kill ourselves.  But that is the sort of ethical 
Puritanism that I think may be standing in the way of the kind 
of political movement I am advocating.  When vegetarians and 
vegans point an accusing finger at the tiniest breach of their 
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ethical convictions, they turn the rest of us off.  For instance, 
look at some of the rhetoric Singer uses in his work:
Our decision to cease [eating meat] may be difficult, 
but it is no more difficult than it would have been for 
a white Southerner to…free his slaves.  If we do not 
change our dietary habits, how can we censure those 
slaveholders who would not change their own way of 
living? (Singer 2011, 51)
The typical consumer’s mixture of ignorance, reluc-
tance to find out the truth, and vague belief that noth-
ing really bad could be allowed seems analogous to 
the attitudes of “decent” Germans to the death camps. 
(Singer 1998, 101)
Many people believe that eating some (environmentally sus-
tainably raised) meat is not wrong.  If we insist that what they 
are doing is wrong because it causes chicken-pain, and we com-
pare their level of evil to Nazis and slaveholders, what prospects 
do we have for building a political consensus with such people? 
Perhaps one to three percent of the U.S. population is vegetar-
ian or vegan.  Even if the ethical purists about meat were to 
convince another three to nine million people that eating meat 
is always wrong, they would thereby reduce the consumption 
of meat in America by about one to three percent.  But if 150 
million people would be open to an argument that they ought to 
eat less meat (and environmentally sustainably raised meat) in 
order to protect the environment for future persons, and could 
be convinced to reduce their meat consumption by 50%, we 
could thereby reduce the consumption of meat in America by 
about 25% (and simultaneously provide an incentive for more 
humane and sustainable animal agriculture practices).  If Sing-
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er and others continue to push the view that chicken-pain is 
morally equivalent to the pain of persons, they will be unlikely 
to achieve political consensus, and unlikely to achieve the re-
ductions in animal suffering that could be achieved if we were 
all to pull together in a political movement to eat less meat (and 
environmentally sustainably produced meat) under the banner 
of intergenerational responsibility.  Thus, ethical puritanism 
about meat may actually be harming the effort to reach a po-
litical consensus that could save the planet for future people.  
As a consumer, I usually want to get the most nutritious, 
best tasting, most convenient and cheapest food I can get.  But 
I am not simply a consumer.  I am also a moral person.  And 
I recognize that my duties to the future require that we place 
restrictions on ourselves (as producers and consumers).  Our 
ethical duties to the future require that we eat less meat and that 
we place restrictions on its production, which ultimately mean 
we have to pay more for it.  Even if eating some (small) amount 
of environmentally sustainably raised meat is ethically permis-
sible, we ought not to be willing to destroy our descendants’ 
world for cheap hamburgers.
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